

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 6 JERUSALEM 558

EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS

FROM ATHERTON

USDEL NO 32

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PGOV, PEPR, IS, EG, XF
SUBJ: MEETING WITH BEGIN FEBRUARY 27

1. SUMMARY: WE MET WITH BEGIN AND HIS COLLEAGUES MORNING
FEBRUARY 27. BEFORE THE LARGE MEETING BEGAN, I TOLD BEGIN
PRIVATELY THAT I HAD NOT YET RECEIVED SADAT'S MESSAGE FOR
HIM AND DID NOT NOW EXPECT TO HAVE IT BEFORE MY RETURN FROM
CAIRO ON MARCH 2. THEN IN LARGE GROUP MEETING, I REVIEWED
MY TALK WITH SADAT, POINTING OUT THAT SADAT WANTS TO CONTINUE
THE PEACE PROCESS AND HAD SAID HE WOULD NOT GO BACK ON HIS
PEACE INITIATIVE. HOWEVER, IASENSED DEEP FRUSTRATION ON
SADAT'S PART. HE WANTS TO GET DOWN TO SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE AND EMPHASIZED THAT HE WANTS GOOD NEIGHBORLY
RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, BUT HE FEELS ISRAEL HAS NOT UNDERSTOOD
AND RESPONDED TO THE SPIRIT OF HIS INITIATIVE. HE RECOGNIZES
ISRAEL'S NEED FOR SECURITY AND WANTS TO GIVE IT SECURITY, BUT
NOT AT PRICE OF LAND OR SOVEREIGNTY. I REPORTED THAT WHILE

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FOREIGN MINISTER KAMEL HAD EXPLICITLY LINKED RESUMPTION OF
POLITICAL COMMITTEE TALKS TO AGREEMENT ON A DECLARATION OF
PRINCIPLES, SADAT'S POSITION HAD BEEN LESS PRECISE; HE HAD
NOT REFUSED BUT HAD INDICATED HE FELT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO
RECONVENE THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE ONLY IF BREAKTHROUGH
COULD BE EXPECTED. ON THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, I SAID
THAT AS I HAD TOLD DAYAN DURING OUR MEETING SATURDAY EVENING

USG JUDGMENT IS THAT THE ASWAN LANGUAGE WILL PROBABLY EMERGE AS THE ONLY WORKABLE BASIS FOR A PALESTINIAN PARAGRAPH. I SAID IT WAS MY IMPRESSION THAT EGYPTIANS WOULD ACCEPT THE ASWAN LANGUAGE, THOUGH THEY WOULD MUCH PREFER A TEXT THAT CALLS OUTRIGHT FOR SELF DETERMINATION. BEGIN THEN PRESENTED TWO ISRAELI DRAFT TEXTS, ONE IDENTICAL TO THE JANUARY 24 ISRAEL PAPER AND THE SECOND SLIGHTLY REARRANGED, BUT WITH NO MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES THEREFROM. BEGIN THEN LAUNCHED INTO A DISCOURSE ON THE USE OF THE PHRASE ON THE "INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORIES BY WAR" IN THE LATEST EGYPTIAN DRAFT, MAINTAINING THAT THE PROHIBITION APPLIES ONLY TO WARS OF AGGRESSION, NOT WARS OF LEGITIMATE SELF DEFENSE AS WAS ISRAEL'S CASE IN 1967. BEGIN SAID THE PALESTINIAN PARAGRAPH OF THE EGYPTIAN DRAFT AND EGYPTIAN AND US IDEA FOR AN INTERIM REGIME AND A PLEBISCITE WOULD INEVITABLE LEAD TO AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE. GOI HAD MADE CLEAR -- HE HAD SPECIFICALLY TOLD SADAT -- THAT ISRAEL WOULD NEVER AGREE TO WITHDRAW TO THE JUNE 4, 1967 BORDERS OR TO ACCEPT A PALESTINIAN STATE. ISRAEL IS READY TO CONSIDER ANY LANGUAGE EGYPT WISHES TO PROPOSE FOR THE DRAFT DECLARATION AS LONG AS IT DOES NOT CALL FOR THESE TWO THINGS. BEGIN SAID HE APPRECIATED SADAT'S EXPRESSIONS OF UNDERSTANDING FOR ISRAEL'S SECURITY PROBLEM BUT POINTED OUT THAT SADAT CANNOT GUARANTEE ISRAEL'S SECURITY. I SAID I HAD CONVEYED TO THE EGYPTIANS THE ISRAELI ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE PHRASE "INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORIES BY WAR" BUT THEY MAINTAIN THAT THE PROHIBITION

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APPLIES REGARDLESS OF THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT. BEGIN SAID THAT FROM ISRAEL'S POINT OF VIEW, THE PALESTINIAN PARAGRAPH IN ISRAEL'S DRAFT IS A "FAR REACHING CONCESSION." YADIN SAID HE THOUGHT THE ISRAELI DRAFT COMPLIES WITH MANY OF EGYPT'S DESIRES. BEGIN SAID HE FELT GOI HAD GIVEN US A "GOOD DOCUMENT TO TAKE TO CAIRO." BEGIN AGAIN RAISED PROBLEM OF THE "ABNORMAL SITUATION" OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN STATUS OF THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL COMMITTEES AND SAID GOI WOULD AGREE TO RECONVENING THE MILITARY COMMITTEE IN ISMAILIA AND THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE IN BEERSHEVA. I SAID I HAD REPORTED TO WASHINGTON ON MY TALKS WITH DAYAN AND BEGIN ON FEBRUARY 22 ABOUT THE APPLICABILITY OF THE WITHDRAWAL PROVISIONS OF 242 TO ALL FRONTS AND HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO CONFIRM THAT THE POINTS THAT I HAD MADE THEREIN REPRESENT THE VIEW OF MY GOVERNMENT. BEGIN SAID IT IS THE US INTERPRETATION THAT 242 APPLIES TO ALL FRONTS; HOWEVER, NOWHERE IS THAT WRITTEN IN 242. REASON ISRAEL OBJECTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT WAS THAT USG WAS ADDING LANGUAGE THAT WAS NOT IN 242. END SUMMARY.

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EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS

FROM ATHERTON

2. MEETING LASTED APPROXIMATELY TWO HOURS. ON OUR SIDE WERE LEWIS, STERNER, KORN, SHERMAN, AND MYSELF. ON ISRAELI SIDE, IN ADDITION TO BEGIN, WERE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER YADIN, FOREIGN MINISTER DAYAN, DEFENSE MINISTER WEIZMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL BARAK, ROSANNE, RUBENSTEIN, AND AVNER OF PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE. BEGIN WAS IN GOOD SPIRITS BUT SEEMED A BIT MORE SERIOUS AND SUBDUED THAN DURING OUR LAST MEETING. BEFORE MEETING OF THE LARGE GROUP BEGAN, I HAD A FEW MINUTES ASIDE WITH BEGIN DURING WHICH I TOLD HIM IN CONFIDENCE THAT WE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED SADAT'S MESSAGE AND WERE UNCERTAIN EXACTLY WHEN IT WOULD BE COMING. I SAID WE PROBABLY COULD NOT EXPECT IT BEFORE MY RETURN TO ISRAEL MARCH 2 FROM CAIRO. I CAUTIONED HIM AGAINST EXPECTING IT WOULD CONTAIN ANY NEW PROPOSALS DIRECTLY AFFECTING PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS; IT WAS LARGELY A REFLECTION OF SADAT'S PRESENT MOOD. BEGIN SAID HE THOUGHT FACT SADAT WANTED SEND HIM A MESSAGE WAS A GOOD SIGN; HE WOULD RESPOND AND COMMUNICATION WOULD BE REESTABLISHED BETWEEN THEM.

3. I OPENED BY GIVING BEGIN A RUNDOWN ON MY MEETING

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WITH PRESIDENT SADAT POINTING OUT THAT I HAD ALREADY GIVEN DAYAN THE FLAVOR OF THE SADAT CONVERSATION ALONG WITH A COPY OF THE EGYPTIAN COUNTER-PROPOSALS FOR THE

DRAFT RESOLUTION. I SAID THE MEETING WITH SADAT HAD BEEN LONG AND THAT HE HAD DONE MOST OF THE TALKING DESPITE THE FACT HE WAS NOT FEELING WELL AND WAS JUST RECOVERING FROM A BAD COLD. I EXPLAINED THAT A MEETING WITH SADAT HAD ORIGINALLY NOT BEEN PLANNED, BUT SADAT TOLD ME THAT HE HAD NOT WANTED ME TO LEAVE EGYPT WITHOUT A MEETING SINCE THAT MIGHT GIVE RISE TO SPECULATION AND TO MISINTERPRETATION. SADAT REITERATED HIS DESIRE TO CONTINUE THE PEACE PROCESS AND TO COOPERATE IN EVERY WAY POSSIBLE WITH MY MISSION,. HE CONFIRMED FOREIGN MINISTER KAMEL'S STATEMENT TO ME THAT EGYPT VERY MUCH WANTS TO COMPLETE THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES.

4. I SAID I THOUGHT I COULD BEST DESCRIBE SADAT'S MOOD AS ONE OF FRUSTRATION. AS DURING HIS WASHINGTON VISIT, HE WAS CONCERNED THAT THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN HIM AND ISRAEL WAS DEALING WITH WORDS AND PROCEDURES, NOT SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. HE REPEATED OVER AND OVER AGAIN THAT THE SPIRIT OF HIS VISIT TO JERUSALEM HAD STILL NOT BEEN UNDERSTOOD IN ISRAEL. BY THIS, HE DID NOT MEAN THAT HE DOESNOT WANT TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATING OVER THE LANGUAGE OF THE DECLARATION BUT HE FEELS THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE TOO DETAILED. SADAT EMPHASIZED THAT HE WANTED TO ESTABLISH GOOD NEIGHBORLY RELATIONSHIPS WITH ISRAEL. HE SAID HE WANTED AN OVERALL AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL THAT WOULD SET A PATTERN FOR THE WHOLE AREA. ANOTHER OF SADAT'S THEMES, I SAID, WAS THE RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL'S NEED FOR SECURITY. HOWEVER, HE COUPLED THIS WITH THE INSISTANCE THAT SECURITY COULD NOT BE AT THE EXPENSE OF LAND OR SOVERIGNTY. SADAT ALSO SPOKE OF HIS UNDER-
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STANDING OF THE NEED FOR INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND HIS WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE IN ANY WAY NECESSARY TO ASSURE THAT ISRAEL WOULD FEEL SECURE. I NOTED THAT SADAT IS THINKING OF A REFERENDUM AT THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. BEGIN ASKED IF I MEANT A REFERENDUM IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA. I SAID YES, BUT THE REFERENDUM WOULD BE DESIGNED TO ESTABLISH LINKS BETWEEN JORDAN AND THE WEST BANK. SADAT IS NOT TALKING ABOUT INDEPENDANCE FOR THE WEST BANK, AND HAS NOT DONE SO FOR SOME TIME. SADAT ALSO STRESSED THAT HE IS IN NO WAY CONCERNED OVER THE ATTACKS ON HIM BY THE REJECTIONISTS. HE SAYS HIS MAIN CONCERN IS THE FAILURE OF ISRAEL TO RESPOND TO HIM IN THE SPIRIT OF HIS INITIATIVE.

5. I SAID I HAD PUT TO SADAT BEGIN'S PROPOSAL FOR RE-CONVENING THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE AND I HAD EXPLAINED THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT'S FEELING REGARDING THE LACK OF SYMMETRY AND THE INEQUALITY CREATED BY THE DIFFERING

STATUS OF THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY COMMITTEES. SADAT'S RESPONSE HAD NOT BEEN CLEAR CUT. ON THE ONE HAND, HE SAID HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO CONTINUING THE WORK OF BOTH COMMITTEES. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE SAW NO POINT IN RE-CONVENING UNLESS THIS WERE DONE IN THE SPIRIT OF HIS CONCEPT OF GETTING DIRECTLY TO SUBSTANCE. SADAT SEEMED TO BE SAYING HE HAD NO OBJECTION IN PRINCIPLE TO RECONVENING, BUT SAW NO POINT IN IT UNLESS THERE WAS SOME PROSPECT FOR A BREAKTHROUGH. I SAID I COULD NOT BE MORE PRECISE THAN THAT BECAUSE SADAT WAS NOT MORE PRECISE.

6. BEGIN ASKED ABOUT MY TALK WITH KAMEL. I SAID I WOULD SUMMARIZE WHAT I HAD TOLD THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON SATURDAY EVENING. I BEGAN MY TALK WITH KAMEL BY GIVING A DESCRIPTION OF MY MEETINGS IN ISRAEL AND EMPHASIZING THAT I HAD FOUND A SERIOUS DESIRE ON THE PART OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO CONTINUE THE WORK ON THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. KAMEL HAD SAID EGYPT
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SHARES THIS DESIRE. WE DISCUSSED THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AT LENGTH AND KAMEL GAVE ME THE EGYPTIAN TEXT WHICH I PRESENTED TO DAYAN SATURDAY EVENING. I SAID WITH KAMEL I ALSO DISCUSSED THE VARIOUS INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ISSUE OF APPLICABILITY OF THE WITHDRAWAL PROVISIONS OF RESOLUTION 242 TO ALL FRONTS. I EXPLAINED THAT THIS PROBLEM IS OF INTEREST TO THE EGYPTIANS BECAUSE THEY SEE IN IT IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NEXT ITEM ON THE POLITICAL AGENDA, I.E. FUTURE OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. I NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE IS SOME RELUCTANCE ON EGYPT'S PART TO GET UNILATERALLY INTO DISCUSSION OF THE FUTURE OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. I HAD URGED THE EGYPTIAN

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EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS

FROM ATHERTON

USDEL NO 32

FOREIGN MINISTER TO GIVE ME SOME REACTION TO ISRAEL'S
SELF RULE PROPOSAL, BUT KAMEL POINTED OUT THAT EGYPT HAS
NO MANDATE TO DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM. KAMEL HAS ASKED THAT
I DISCUSS THIS WITH HUSSEIN WHEN I SEE HIM ON MARCH 4. I SAID,
IN THIS CONNECTION, THAT I WOULD WELCOME THOUGHTS THE ISRAELI
GOVERNMENT MIGHT HAVE IN REGARD TO MY VISIT TO AMMAN.

7. I SAID THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S REPLY CONCERNING ISRAEL'S
PROPOSAL FOR RECONVENING THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE HAD BEEN
MORE SPECIFIC IN LINKING THE RECONVENING TO WORK ON THE
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES THAN SADAT'S. KAMEL SAID THAT RECON-
VENING SHOULD WAIT UNTIL THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES IS
COMPLETED AND JORDAN JOINS THE TALKS, TAKING IT FOR GRANTED
THAT AGREEMENT ON THE DECLARATION WOULD MEAN THAT HUSSEIN WOULD
JOIN. I SAID SADAT, HOWEVER, TAKES A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT POSITION
ON THIS MATTER. HE DOES NOT THINK WE SHOULD PRESS HUSSEIN NOW
TO JOIN THE TALKS. HE TAKES THE POSITION THAT EGYPT AND ISRAEL
SHOULD WORK OUT THE PROBLEMS FIRST, AND THEN HUSSEIN WILL
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AUTOMATICALLY JOIN.

8. WITH REGARD TO THE LATEST EGYPTIAN DRAFT OF THE DECLARATION,
I POINTED OUT THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD BEEN THINKING OF PUTTING
FORWARD LANGUAGE THAT WAS EVEN HARDER THAN WHAT THEY HAD TALKED
ABOUT ON FEBRUARY 1. THEY WERE THINKING ABOUT GOING BACK TO
LANGUAGE THAT THEY HAD SUBMITTED AT THE OPENING OF THE POLITICAL
COMMITTEE MEETINGS IN JERUSALEM WHICH CALLED FOR WITHDRAWAL
SPECIFICALLY FROM GOLAN, THE WEST BANK, GAZA AND SINAI.
WE SOUGHT TO DISCOURAGE THEM FROM DOING SO, AND IN THE END
THEIR DRAFT DID NOT INCLUDE SUCH LANGUAGE. I SAID I REALIZED
THAT FROM ISRAEL'S POINT OF VIEW THE EGYPTIAN TEXT CONTAINS
MANY DIFFICULT POINTS, BUT I WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR IT IS NOT
AS RETROGRESSIVE AS IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN.

9. I RECALLED THAT I HAD TOLD DAYAN IN OUR MEETING SATURDAY
EVENING THAT I WOULD LIKE TO GET SOME IDEA CONCERNING ISRAEL'S

RELATIVE PRIORITIES IN REGARD TO THE VARIOUS PARTS OF THE DRAFT DECLARATION. I SHOULD KNOW WHAT IS MORE AND WHAT IS LESS IMPORTANT TO THE GOI SO THAT I CAN GET A FEEL FOR WHERE THERE CAN BE ACCOMMODATION BY BOTH SIDES. I SAID I HAD ASKED THE EGYPTIANS ALSO TO LET ME KNOW WHAT SCALE OF IMPORTANCE THEY ATTACH TO THE VARIOUS PARTS OF THE DECLARATION. IT WAS MY IMPRESSION THAT ULTIMATELY EGYPT WILL ACCEPT THE ASWAN LANGUAGE. THE ASWAN LANGUAGE IS PROBABLY GOING TO BE WHAT FINALLY EMERGES. I POINTED OUT THAT THIS WAS NOT SIMPLY MY OWN PERSONAL POINT OF VIEW; I HAD INSTRUCTIONS IN THIS REGARD FROM SECRETARY VANCE. THE EGYPTIANS SAY THAT THE ASWAN LANGUAGE ALREADY REPRESENTS A CONSIDERABLE CONCESSION ON THEIR PART. THEY WOULD PREFER LANGUAGE THAT ESTABLISHES PRINCIPLE OF SELF DETERMINATION FULLY AND CLEARLY, WHEREAS THE ASWAN LANGUAGE CALLS ONLY FOR PALESTINIANS TO "PARTICIPATE IN THE DETERMINATION OF THEIR OWN FUTURE." BUT I SAID I THOUGHT THE EGYPTIANS WOULD ACCEPT

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THE ASWAN TEXT, ALTHOUGH THAT IS PROBABLY AS FAR AS THEY WILL BE ABLE TO GO. I SAID I WAS GIVING THE FOREGOING AS OUR JUDGMENT FOLLOWING OUR TALKS WITH SADAT IN WASHINGTON AND MY MEETINGS IN CAIRO.

10. BEGIN THEN HANDED US TWO TEXTS MARKED (A) AND (B) WHICH HE SAID I COULD TAKE BACK WITH ME TO CAIRO. HE POINTED OUT THAT (A) IS THE TEXT THAT DAYAN GAVE ME ON JANUARY 24 AND WHICH I HAD PRESENTED IN CAIRO AT THE END OF JANUARY. (B) CONTAINS LANGUAGE IDENTICAL TO (A) BUT IN (B) PARAGRAPH FIVE OF (A) HAS BEEN MOVED UP TO THREE AND STRENGTHENED SOMEWHAT. (WE ARE CABLING BY SEPTTEL THE TEXT OF (B)); SINCE (A) IS THE JANUARY 24 TEXT, IT IS ALREADY IN THE DEPARTMENT'S POSSESSION.) BEGIN EXPLAINED THAT THIS CHANGE WAS MADE BECAUSE, IN ISRAEL'S VIEW, THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL AND SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES FOLLOWS LOGICALLY THE PARAGRAPH ON NEGOTIATIONS ON PEACE TREATIES. BEGIN SAID EITHER OR BOTH OF THESE DRAFTS COULD BE PRESENTED TO THE EGYPTIANS. ISRAEL IS READY TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF EITHER ONE.

11. BEGIN THEN SAID HE WANTED TO MAKE SOME COMMENTS ABOUT THE LATEST EGYPTIAN DRAFT, AND HE FOCUSED IMMEDIATELY ON THE PHRASE IN PARAGRAPH FOUR CONCERNING THE "INADMISSABILITY OF ACQUISITION OF TERRITORIES BY WAR." THE MEANING OF THIS PHRASE, BEGIN SAID, IS FULL WITHDRAWAL, NOT THE SLIGHTEST CHANGE IN THE BORDERS. MOREOVER, THIS LANGUAGE IS FROM THE PREAMBLE OF RESOLUTION 242 AND TO PUT IT INTO THE TEXT OF THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES IS INAPPROPRIATE AND WOULD GIVE IT A FORCE AND A STANDING THAT WAS NEVER INTENDED. ALSO, BEGIN CONTINUED, THE LANGUAGE FROM 242 ON THE INADMISSABILITY ON THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORIES BY WAR APPLIES TO WARS OF AGGRESSION, NOT WARS OF SELF DEFENSE. WHEN A NATION DEFENDS ITSELF AND BY SUCH

DEFENSE GAINS TERRITORY, THE PRINCIPLE IS NOT APPLICABLE, BEGIN SAID. A WAR OF LEGITIMATE SELF DEFENSE ENTITLES THE VICTOR, IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE TREATY, OF COURSE, BEGIN SAID, TO ASK FOR TERRITORY. ISRAEL'S
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WAR OF 1967 WAS IN EVERY WAY A WAR OF SELF DEFENSE, NOT OF AGGRESSION. BEGIN STRESSED THAT THIS HAS BEEN CLEARLY ACKNOWLEDGED BY AMERICAN PRESIDENTS AND SENIOR OFFICIALS IN CORRESPONDENCE WITH ISRAEL LEADERS. PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND MANY OTHERS HAD WRITTEN TO ISRAEL ABOUT "THE WAR THAT WAS THRUST UPON US." BEGIN THEN RECOUNTED THE DAYS IN LATE MAY 1967, WHEN ISRAEL WAS ENCIRCLED BY A "RING OF STEEL" AND THE GOVERNMENT HAD TO DECIDE WHETHER TO WAIT UNTIL THE OTHER SIDE STARTED SHOOTING. ISRAEL WAS IN THE GRAVEST NATIONAL DANGER, BEGIN SAID, AND THE WAR THAT ENSURED WAS A WAR OF LEGITIMATE SELF DEFENSE IN THE HIGHEST SENSE OF THE WORD.

12. BEGIN SAID THE LANGUAGE IN PARAGRAPH FIVE OF THE EGYPTIAN DRAFT OF FEBRUARY 23 MEANS AUTOMATICALLY A PALESTINIAN STATE. THE EGYPTIANS TALK ABOUT A PALESTINIAN ENTITY, AN INTERIM PERIOD, AND A PLEBISCITE. THIS, BEGIN REMARKED, ALSO SEEMS TO BE THE US IDEA. YOU SAY THE ENTITY WOULD BE LINKED WITH JORDAN OR WITH ISRAEL, OR WOULD CONTINUE THE STATUS QUO, AND THAT THERE WOULD BE NO INDEPENDENCE. BUT, BEGIN CONTINUED, I SAY THAT FROM THE DAY THE PALESTINIANS WILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE, THEY WILL WANT TOO THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE HOW THEY DETERMINE THAT FUTURE. THEY WILL INSIST ON HAVING THE OPTION OF INDEPENDENCE. IF THAT OPTION IS NOT INCLUDED, EITHER THEY WILL BOYCOTT THE PLEBISCITE OR THEY WILL WRITE INTO THE BALLOT THEIR PREFERENCE FOR A PALESTINIAN STATE. NOBODY CAN PREVENT IT, BEGIN SAID, AND IF YOU TRY TO, THE PLEBISCITE WILL BECOME A MOCKERY. BEGIN POINTED OUT THAT ISRAEL'S LANGUAGE SAYS THE PALESTINIAN ARABS OF JUDEA AND SAMARIA WILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DETERMINATION OF THEIR FUTURE THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. ISRAEL'S TEXT DOES NOT TALK ABOUT A PLEBISCITE.

13. BEGIN THEN SAID HE WANTED TO "EXPLAIN THE ABSURDITIES
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OF THE EGYPTIAN FORMULA ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION." PARAGRAPH FIVE OF THE EGYPTIAN DRAFT SPEAKS OF THE "LEGITIMATE RIGHTS" OF THE "PALESTINIAN PEOPLE". WHO, BEGIN ASKED RHETORICALLY, ARE THE PALESTINIANS? THIS WORD "PALESTINIAN PEOPLE" IS ONE OF THE GREAT MISREPRESENTATIONS OF OUR TIME, BEGIN SAID.

TO APPLY THE TERM "PALESTINIAN PEOPLE" TO THE PEOPLE OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA IS A MISREPRESENTATION, BEGIN SAID. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT ISRAEL AND THE US AGREED IN THE OCTOBER 5 WORKING PAPER TO USE THE TERM "PALESTINIAN ARABS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA." BEGIN SAID THERE WERE TWO DEMANDS SET OUT BY SADAT BEFORE AND DURING HIS VISIT TO JERUSALEM WHICH SADAT SHOULD KNOW THAT HE WILL NOT GET FROM ISRAEL. ONE IS A COMMITMENT FROM ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW TO THE LINES OF JUNE 4, 1967; AND THE OTHER IS A PALESTINIAN STATE. SADAT SHOULD KNOW THAT THESE TWO THINGS ARE OUT OF THE QUESTION, BEGIN SAID, BECAUSE

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I TOLD HIM SO. I TOLD HIM ONLY THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ISRAEL WILL ACCEPT THESE DEMANDS. BEGIN REPEATED THAT PARAGRAPH FIVE OF THE LATEST EGYPTIAN DRAFT COMES DOWN TO A PRECOMMITMENT BY ISRAEL TO RELINQUISH GOLAN, WEST BANK, GAZA, AND SINAI AND TO ACCEPT A PALESTINIAN STATE. HE REITERATED THAT ISRAEL COULD NEVER DO SO.

14. BEGIN SAID ISRAEL IS READY TO CONSIDER ANY LANGUAGE THAT EGYPT MIGHT PUT FORWARD SO LONG AS IT DOES NOT MEAN FULL WITHDRAWAL AND A PALESTINIAN STATE. BEGIN SAID SADAT MAY RESPOND THAT IF THAT IS THE CASE, THERE IS NOTHING TO TALK ABOUT. BUT HE HOPED SADAT WOULD NOT SAY THIS. DEMANDS FOR FULL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND FOR A FULL PALESTINIAN STATE ARE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION 242. THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, BEGIN SAID, IS NOT EVEN MENTIONED IN 242 AND 242 DOES NOT CALL FOR FULL WITHDRAWAL. THEREFORE, ISRAEL IS NOT COMMITTED IN

ANY WAY TO SUBMIT TO EITHER OF THESE DEMANDS.

15. BEGIN SAID HE WAS GRATEFUL TO SADAT FOR SAYING
HE UNDERSTANDS ISRAEL'S PROBLEM OF SECURITY.
BUT SADAT CANNOT GUARANTEE ISRAEL'S SECURITY.

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COULD HE GUARANTEE THE LIFE OF YUSEF SABAI? COULD HE
GUARANTEE ISRAEL'S SECURITY IF THE PLO TAKES OVER THE
WEST BANK? BEGIN REITERATED THAT ISRAEL CANNOT NEGOTIATE
ON ANY LANGUAGE THAT CALLS FOR FULL WITHDRAWAL AND FOR
A PALESTINIAN STATE.

16. BEGIN THEN SAID HE WOULD COMMENT ON A FEW OTHER
MATTERS IN THE EGYPTIAN DRAFT. HE NOTED THAT PARAGRAPH
TWO SPEAKS OF NEGOTIATING PEACE TREATIES ON THE BASIS
OF THE "IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND
338 IN ALL OF THEIR PARTS." BEGIN SAID HE DID NOT SEE WHY
IT IS NECESSARY TO USE THE WORD "IMPLEMENTATION"
OR "IN ALL OF THEIR PARTS." ISRAEL PREFERS THE LANGUAGE
WORKED OUT WITH THE UNITED STATES WHICH SPEAKS OF
NEGOTIATIONS OF PEACE TREATIES ON THE "BASIS OF ALL
THE PRINCIPLES" OF RESOLUTION 242. BEGIN NOTED THAT
EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI LANGUAGE IN PARAGRAPH SIX IS ALMOST
IDENTICAL, BUT SAID ISRAEL WISHES TO ADD "THROUGH THE CONCLUSION OF
PEACE TREATIES" AT THE END OF PARAGRAPH SIX. YADIN SAID
HE THOUGHT ISRAEL'S DRAFT (B) WAS VERY FORTHCOMING. IT
COMPLIES WITH MANY OF EGYPT'S DESIRES, YADIN SAID.
WEIZMAN SAID YES, IT GOES VERY FAR, AND BECAUSE OF
THAT "WE ARE GOING TO HAVE PROBLEMS IN THE PARTY."
YADIN REITERATED THAT HE THOUGHT THE ISRAELI DRAFT WAS
A CLEAR, LUCID DOCUMENT THAT TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE
NEEDS OF THE EGYPTIANS. BEGIN SAID, "WE HAVE GIVEN YOU
A GOOD DOCUMENT FOR CAIRO."

17. I SAID I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A FEW COMMENTS. FIRST, I WANTED
SIMPLY TO MAKE
SURE THE RECORD IS CORRECT. BEGIN HAD SPOKEN EARLIER
OF MY AGREEMENT TO THE ISRAELI TEXT PRESENTED AT THE
END OF JANUARY TO THE EGYPTIANS. I WAS SURE HE MEANT
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THAT I HAD AGREED TO PRESENT THE TEXT, NOT THAT I HAD
AGREED TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE TEXT. BEGIN SAID YES, THAT
WAS CLEAR. CONCERNING BEGIN'S COMMENTS ON PARAGRAPH TWO,
I DID NOT THINK THAT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EGYPTIAN

LANGUAGE IN THAT PARAGRAPH AND THE ISRAELI LANGUAGE ARE INSURMOUNTABLE. IF OTHER PROBLEMS, NOTABLY THE PALESTINIAN LANGUAGE, CAN BE RESOLVED, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF PARAGRAPH TWO. CONCERNING PARAGRAPH FOUR OF THE LATEST EGYPTIAN DRAFT, I SAID I HAD TOLD THE EGYPTIANS THAT THEIR LANGUAGE ON THE INADMISSABILITY OF THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORIES BY WAR WOULD CAUSE PROBLEMS FOR ISRAEL. I HAD POINTED OUT THAT THIS WOULD BE SEEN AS CONVERTING THE PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH OF RESOLUTION 242 INTO AN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH. I SAID I WOULD MAKE THIS POINT ONCE AGAIN WHEN I GO BACK TO CAIRO, BUT BOUTROS GHALI HAD ARGUED THAT IT HAD BEEN STATED IN RECENT DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE THAT THE LANGUAGE OF THE PREAMBLE OF AN AGREEMENT HAS THE SAME FORCE AS THE OPERATIVE. I ASKED IF BARAK AND ROSENNE WOULD LIKE TO LOOK INTO THIS AND GIVE ME SOMETHING TO USE WITH GHALI WHEN I GO BACK TO CAIRO. ON THE POINT OF THE NATURE OF THE 1967 WAR, I SAID THE PRIME MINISTER WAS ENTIRELY CORRECT IN SAYING THAT ISRAEL'S ACTION HAD NEVER BEEN DESCRIBED BY US AS A WAR OF AGGRESSION. THE UN HAD NOT TERMED IT A WAR OF AGGRESSION ON ISRAEL'S PART; THE UN HAD NOT MADE ANY DETERMINATION ON THIS SUBJECT. HOWEVER, THE POINT MADE BY THE EGYPTIANS IS THAT THE INJUNCTION AGAINST THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORIES BY WAR APPLIES WITHOUT ANY QUALIFICATION, WHETHER THE WAR WAS ONE OF AGGRESSION OR SELF DEFENSE. FOR ITS PARTS, THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT SAID THAT 242 RULES OUT ANY TERRITORIAL CHANGES, BUT NEITHER DOES IT REQUIRE SUCH CHANGES. WHETHER THERE ARE BORDER CHANGES WILL, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, DEPEND ON THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE DECISION WILL HAVE TO BE MADE ON THE BASIS OF WHAT CAN BE ACCEPTED IN PEACE TREATIES, AND
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A CHOICE MAY HAVE TO BE MADE BETWEEN PEACE AND TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION. WITH REGARD TO BEGIN'S POINT THAT THE PALESTINIANS WOULD WANT AN OPTION FOR INDEPENDENCE INCLUDED IN THE PLEBISCITE, I POINTED OUT THAT ISRAEL WOULD BE ONE OF THE PARTIES, ALONG WITH JORDAN, EGYPT AND PALESTINIANS, IN NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE DETERMINATION OF THE CHOICES THAT WOULD BE OFFERED. THEREFORE, ISRAEL WOULD HAVE A VETO. IF IT DID NOT AGREE, THE OPTION FOR INDEPENDENCE WOULD NOT EMERGE. I ASKED IF, IN THIS REGARD, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE LINKAGE WERE RESTORED IN PARAGRAPH FIVE BETWEEN THE LANGUAGE ON ENABLING THE PALESTINIANS TO PARTICIPATE IN DETERMINING THEIR OWN FUTURE AND THAT ON TALKS BETWEEN EGYPT, JORDAN, ISRAEL

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AND PALESTINIANS, WHICH LATEST EGYPTIAN DRAFT SPLIT INTO TWO
SENTENCES. DAYAN AND BARAK SAID IT WOULD.

18. BEGIN ASKED WHY THE EGYPTIANS DO NOT WANT TO USE THE
WORD ARAB? THE DECLARATION SHOULD SPEAK NOT OF "THE PALESTINIAN
PEOPLE" BUT OF "PALESTINIAN ARABS." WHAT DO THEY HAVE AGAINST
THE USE OF THE PROUD WORD ARAB, HE AGAIN ASKED. EVEN THE BRITISH
ACCEPTED THIS WORD, BEGIN SAID. CALLAGHAN HAD TOLD HIM THAT
HE ALWAYS NOW SAYS "PALESTINIAN ARABS." BEGIN SAID THAT FROM
ISRAEL'S POINT OF VIEW, THE LANGUAGE IN THE PALESTINIAN
PARAGRAPH OF ISRAEL'S DRAFT IS A FAR-REACHING CONCESSION AND
A GREAT DEPARTURE FROM RESOLUTION 242. HE REITERATED THAT THE
EGYPTIAN LANGUAGE AUTOMATICALLY MEANS A PALESTINIAN STATE AND
THAT ISRAEL CANNOT ACCEPT THIS. IF ISRAEL AGREES TO WITHDRAW
FROM THE WEST BANK, TERRORIST INCURSIONS WILL BECOME A DALY
PHENOMENON. EVERYBODY REMEMBERS WHAT IT WAS LIKE BEFORE THE
1967 WAR. BEGIN SAID THIS IS ONE OF THE PRIMARY REASONS WHY
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ISRAEL CANNOT AGREE TO LEAVE THE WEST BANK. HE REITERATED THAT
ISRAEL IS READY TO CONSIDER ANY EGYPTIAN FORMULA THAT DOES NOT

MEAN A FULL WITHDRAWAL OR A PALESTINIAN STATE.

19. DAYAN SAID THE EGYPTIANS WANT ISRAEL TO ACCEPT A COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAWAL EVEN BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS. BUT THIS IS A MATTER FOR NEGOTIATIONS, DAYAN SAID IT IS SOMETHING THAT ISRAEL AND EGYPT SHOULD DISCUSS FACE TO FACE. IF SADAT REALLY WANTS TO MAKE PEACE, HE CANNOT ASK ISRAEL TO COMMIT ITSELF TO EVERYTHING IN ADVANCE OF NEGOTIATIONS. DAYAN SAID THERE WAS ONE OTHER POINT HE WANTED TO MAKE. THAT WAS THAT WHEN THE ARABS TALK ABOUT THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE THEIR FUTURE, WHAT THEY REALLY MEAN IS THEIR RIGHT TO DETERMINE ISRAEL'S FUTURE. THEY WANT A DECLARATION THAT CALLS FOR ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES AND ITS SETTLEMENTS FROM THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. THIS INVOLVES NOT ONLY THEIR FUTURE, BUT THE FUTURE OF ISRAEL AND OF ISRAELI SETTLERS. DAYAN SAID HE WOULD NOT INTERFERE IN THE RIGHT OF THE ARABS TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE, BUT THEY CANNOT CLAIM THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE ISRAEL'S FUTURE. I SAID THAT WITH REGARD TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S FIRST POINT, WE ARE ALREADY IN NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS NOT CORRECT TO SAY THAT SADAT IS TRYING TO OBTAIN CERTAIN THINGS PRIOR TO NEGOTIATIONS. THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE HAS HELD MEETINGS, AND NEGOTIATIONS ARE NOW BEING CARRIED OUT THROUGH US INTERMEDIARY. WE ARE TRYING TO FIND PRACTICAL PRAGMATIC SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS. THE ONLY PRECOMMITMENT IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS IS RESOLUTION 242. REGARDING THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S SECOND POINT, I ACKNOWLEDGED A CERTAIN VALIDITY IN WHAT HE SAID ABOUT THE PALESTINIANS NOT HAVING THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE ISRAEL'S FUTURE. HOWEVER, DAYAN'S EXAMPLE SIMPLY ILLUSTRATES HOW CLOSELY LINKED THE INTERESTS AND THE FUTURE OF ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS ARE. BOTH SIDES HAVE TO RECOGNIZE THAT NOTHING CAN BE DETERMINED UNILATERALLY. YADIN SAID HE WAS GLAD TO HEAR THIS, BUT HE
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POINTED OUT THAT THE US SPOKE OF A PALESTINIAN ENTITY LINKED TO JORDAN, NOT TO ISRAEL. THAT HE FOUND DISTURBING. DAYAN RECALLED THAT WE HAD SAID EGYPT IS RELUCTANT TO NEGOTIATE CONCERNING THE FUTURE OF THE WEST BANK BECAUSE IT CONSIDERS THAT IT HAS NO MANDATE TO DO SO. BUT, IN FACT, SADAT IS NEGOTIATING ON THIS ISSUE IN THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES.

20. BEGIN SAID THE "ABNORMAL SITUATION" REGARDING THE MILITARY AND THE POLITICAL COMMITTEES MUST BE CORRECTED. IF SADAT WERE TO PROPOSE THAT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE SHOULD MEET IN ISMAILIA AND THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE IN BEERSHEVA, BEGIN SAID, WE WOULD AGREE. WE AGREE WITH SADAT REGARDING THE NEED TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS. THEREFORE, WHY GO ON SHUTTLING? SADAT SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS NOW BEING CONDUCTED ARE PRELIMINARY; THIS IS NOT DIRECT NEGOTIATION. IN THESE PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS, ISRAEL CANNOT COMMIT ITSELF TO ALL THE THINGS THAT SADAT WANTS. BEGIN THEN REITERATED THAT GREAT CARE

MUST BE TAKEN TO AVOID LANGUAGE IN THE DECLARATION THAT WOULD LEAD TO A PALESTINIAN STATE. I SAID IT IS OUR JUDGMENT THAT THE FACT THAT ISRAEL WOULD BE ONE OF THE PARTIES TO THE NEGOTIATION ON THE FUTURE OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WOULD BE A SAFEGUARD AGAINST A PALESTINIAN STATE.

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21. I SAID I HAD REPORTED IN FULL THE DISCUSSION DURING OUR MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON FEBRUARY 23 REGARDING THE QUESTION OF APPLICABILITY OF THE WITHDRAWAL PROVISION OF 242 TO ALL FRONTS. I HAD BEEN SPECIFICALLY INSTRUCTED TO CONFIRM TO THE PRIME MINISTER THAT THE POINTS I HAD MADE IN THAT DISCUSSION REPRESENTED THE VIEW OF MY GOVERNMENT. WE ARE OF THE FIRM OPINION THAT THE WITHDRAWAL PROVISION OF RESOLUTION 242 APPLIES TO ALL FRONTS. THIS IS ONE OF THE FEW UNIVERSALLY AGREED INTERPRETATIONS OF 242, I NOTED. BEGIN REPLIED THAT THE VIEW THAT 242 APPLIES TO ALL FRONTS IS THE U.S. INTERPRETATION. ALL ISRAEL HAD SAID IS THAT THIS VIEW IS NOT SPELLED OUT ANYWHERE IN RESOLUTION 242. THEREFORE, THE RESOLUTION IS OPEN TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS. BEGIN SAID ISRAEL HAD OBJECTED TO THE LANGUAGE ON WITHDRAWAL ON ALL FRONTS IN THE WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT BECAUSE THIS WAS SOMETHING THAT WAS NOT SPECIFICALLY STATED IN 242.

22. AS THE MEETING CLOSED, BEGIN ASKED ME TO CONVEY ISRAEL'S VIEWS TO THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT AND ITS DRAFT DECLARATION. HE SAID HE WOULD BE LOOKING FORWARD TO

SEEING ME WHEN I RETURNED TO JERUSALEM ON MARCH 2.

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